

Message Text

PAGE 01 STATE 122146

15

ORIGIN EA-10

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 PM-03 H-02 DODE-00 SP-02 CIAE-00 INR-07

NSAE-00 /025 R

DRAFTED BY EA/RA-PMU:RWFINCH:GMD
APPROVED BY EA/RA - ROBERT J. MARTENS
PM/ISP-MR. BROWN

----- 057334

R 240130Z MAY 75
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY BANGKOK
AMEMBASSY MANILA
AMEMBASSY SEOUL
AMEMBASSY TOKYO
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI
INFO CINCPAC

UNCLAS STATE 122146

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: N/A
TAGS: MARR, ALIB, XC
SUBJECT: SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE REPORT

REF: BANGKOK 9331

FOLLOWING EXCERPT FROM PAGES 121-122 SENATE ARMED SERVICE
COMMITTEE REPORT ON FY 76 DOD PROCUREMENT AUTHORIZATION
BILL (S. 920) DATED MAY 19, 1975 IS REPEATED FOR ADDRESSEE
POSTS' INFORMATION. WILL TRY TO CLARIFY APPARENT
OMISSION FROM PARAGRAPH ON THAILAND. VERBATIM TEXT
FOLLOWS:

QUOTE. TROOP LEVELS IN THE PACIFIC. THE U.S. MUST DEVELOP
A CLEAR POLICY AND A RELATED DEFENSE POSTURE TO MEET OUR
LONG TERM INTERESTS IN ASIA. WE HAVE CUT BACK OUR TROOP
LEVELS IN THE PACIFIC FROM 243,000 IN 1964, BEFORE MAJOR
INVOLVEMENT IN VIETNAM TO ABOUT 165,000 AT THE PRESENT TIME.
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 02 STATE 122146

OVER 30,000 OF OUR PERSONNEL IN THE PACIFIC ARE ABOARD
SHIPS. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE QUESTIONS WHICH CAN BE RAISED
REGARDING THE NUMBER OF MILITARY PERSONNEL THE U.S. KEEPS
IN ANY PARTICULAR COUNTRY OR BASE, WE SHOULD NOT CONTINUE

CUTTING OUR MILITARY FORCES IN THE PACIFIC UNTIL WE HAVE DEVELOPED A CLEAR POLICY UPON WHICH WE CAN BASE A MILITARY POSTURE. THE COMMITTEE HAS SEVERAL RECOMMENDATIONS THAT ARE AIMED AT STARTING THIS REEVALUATION OF OUR PACIFIC POSTURE.

QUOTE. PACIFIC BASING POSTURE. IN ORDER TO BEGIN NOW TO ASSURE A CLEAR POLICY AND ADEQUATE DEFENSE POSTURE TO MEET OUR LONG TERM INTERESTS IN ASIA, THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE IS REQUESTED TO STUDY AND REPORT TO THE COMMITTEE BY DECEMBER 31, 1975 ON LONG-TERM BASING ALTERNATIVES IN THE PACIFIC. THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE AN EXAMINATION OF FORCE POSTURE THROUGHOUT THE PACIFIC AND ASIA: KOREA, JAPAN, TAIWAN, THE PHILIPPINES, THAILAND AND OTHER LOCATIONS.

QUOTE. THAILAND. THE TOTAL REDUCTION IN MILITARY STRENGTH OF 18,300 RECOMMENDED BY THE COMMITTEE INCLUDED 3,500 THAT WERE BASED UPON THE REDEPLOYMENT OF ALL COMBAT FORCES FROM THAILAND BY THE END OF FY 1976. THE 3,500 REDUCTIONS ARE SUPPORT PERSONNEL WHO ARE BASED IN THAILAND FOR EITHER (APPARENT OMISSION) NAMESE AND CAMBODIAN FORCES. NO REDUCTIONS WERE MADE IN THE OVERALL COMBAT FORCE STRUCTURE.

QUOTE. THE THAI GOVERNMENT HAS CALLED FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL U.S. FORCES FROM THAILAND BY THE END OF FY 1976. THE FALL OF CAMBODIA AND SOUTH VIETNAM AND THE ELIMINATION OF U.S. AID PROGRAMS FOR THOSE COUNTRIES HAS ELIMINATED THE MAIN PURPOSE OF MAJOR U.S. COMBAT PRESENCE IN THAILAND. CONTINUING TO KEEP LARGE NUMBERS OF U.S. COMBAT FORCES IN THAILAND SERVES NO MAJOR U.S. INTEREST, DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE DESIRED BY THE THAI GOVERNMENT, WEAKENS THE CREDIBILITY OF THOSE FORCES AS A DETERRENT IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD, AND EXPOSES OUR MEN UNNECESSARILY TO RISKS AND HARDSHIPS IN THAT AREA.

UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 03 STATE 122146

QUOTE. KOREA. THE U.S. HAS SOME 42,000 PERSONNEL STATIONED IN KOREA. 34,000 OF THESE ARE GROUND FORCES. THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE ESTIMATES THAT THE SOUTH KOREAN GROUND FORCES ARE CAPABLE OF DEFENDING SOUTH KOREA AGAINST A GROUND ATTACK BY NORTH KOREA, ALTHOUGH THE SOUTH KOREAN AIR CAPABILITY MUST BE SUPPLEMENTED AND IMPROVED. THERE HAS BEEN CONSIDERABLE DISCUSSION ABOUT WHETHER IT WAS NECESSARY, IN LIGHT OF THE IMPROVEMENTS THAT HAVE OCCURRED IN SOUTH KOREAN FORCES, AND ALSO WHETHER IT WAS DESIRABLE TO KEEP THE AMERICAN GROUND TROOPS--MAINLY THE 2ND INFANTRY DIVISION--IN KOREA WHERE THEY COULD BECOME IMMEDIATELY INVOLVED IN A WAR PRIOR TO A SPECIFIC U.S. DECISION TO BECOME INVOLVED. HOWEVER, IT WOULD BE

PSYCHOLOGICALLY AND MILITARILY DETRIMENTAL TO U.S. INTEREST TO WITHDRAW OUR FORCES FROM KOREA NOW, PARTICULARLY AFTER THE VIETNAM EXPERIENCE, AND WITHOUT MAKING SURE OUR KOREAN FRIENDS CAN PROVIDE FOR THEIR OWN DEFENSE. AN

UNPLANNED REDUCTION OF U.S. GROUND FORCES FROM KOREA WITHOUT A CORRESPONDING IMPROVEMENT IN SOUTH KOREAN CAPABILITY, PARTICULARLY IN TACTICAL AIR, COULD RESULT IN A DANGEROUS SHIFT IN THE MILITARY BALANCE IN KOREA AND WOULD GREATLY INCREASE THE DANGER OF RENEWED CONFLICT.

QUOTE. THEREFORE, AS PART OF THE OVERALL PACIFIC BASING STUDY, THE COMMITTEE REQUESTS THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TO DO AN IN-DEPTH STUDY OF OUR MILITARY POSTURE IN KOREA AND ALTERNATIVES TO THE CURRENT POSTURE. AMONG THE ALTERNATIVES THAT SHOULD BE EXAMINED WOULD BE ONE THAT (A) IMPROVES U.S. AND SOUTH KOREAN TACTICAL AIR CAPABILITIES; (B) PROVIDES MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO THE SOUTH KOREAN ARMED FORCES, MAINLY AMMUNITION AND SPARE PARTS; (C) ENHANCES THE SOUTH KOREAN PRODUCTION BASE SO THAT IT CAN PROVIDE MORE OF ITS OWN MILITARY CAPABILITIES; AND (D) EXAMINES VARIOUS U.S. GROUND FORCE LEVELS IN KOREA.

QUOTE. JAPAN/OKINAWA. IT IS CLEARLY IN THE U.S. INTERESTS TO REMAIN CLOSELY ALLIED WITH JAPAN. HOWEVER, THE COMMITTEE IS CONCERNED BY REPORTS THAT U.S. FORCES BASED IN JAPAN MAY HAVE POLITICAL CONSTRAINTS PLACED UPON THEM
UNCLASSIFIED

PAGE 04 STATE 122146

BECAUSE OF THE JAPANESE DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION. THIS IS PARTICULARLY TRUE OF THE MARINE DIVISION BASED ON OKINAWA. ALTHOUGH THAT DIVISION IS COMBAT READY, UNENCUMBERED WITH DEPENDENTS, AND PERFORMED WELL IN THE EVACUATION OF PHNOM PENH AND SAIGON, AND THE RECENT SUCCESSFUL RECOVERY OF THE AMERICAN MERCHANT SHIP FROM CAMBODIAN FORCES, ITS USE IN SUPPORT OF AMERICAN INTERESTS COULD BE LIMITED BY ANOTHER COUNTRY. THE COMMITTEE REQUESTS THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE TO NOTIFY THE COMMITTEE OF ANY LIMITATIONS PLACED IN THE USE OF THESE FORCES BY JAPAN.

QUOTE. THEREFORE, ALTERNATIVE BASING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE MARINE DIVISION AND WING IN JAPAN AND OKINAWA SHOULD BE INCLUDED IN THE PACIFIC BASING STUDY REQUESTED ABOVE. THIS STUDY SHOULD INCLUDE THE ROTATION OF MARINE UNITS IN AND OUT OF OKINAWA, AS WELL AS OTHER AREAS IN THE WESTERN PACIFIC. IT SHOULD ALSO CONSIDER BASING SOME OF THE MARINES ON GUAM. END QUOTE. KISSINGER

UNCLASSIFIED

<< END OF DOCUMENT >>

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 26 AUG 1999
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: TROOP DEPLOYMENT, US CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 24 MAY 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: n/a
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: n/a
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment:
Disposition Date: 01 JAN 1960
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975STATE122146
Document Source: ADS
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: EA/RA-PMU:RWFINCH:GMD
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: N/A
Errors: n/a
Film Number: D750183-0734
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t197505103/baaaakte.tel
Line Count: 162
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, TEXT ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN EA
Original Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators:
Previous Classification: n/a
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: CunninFX
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 28 JUL 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <28 JUL 2003 by SilvaL0>; APPROVED <30 JAN 2004 by CunninFX>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
05 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: n/a
TAGS: MARR, ALIB, XC, TH, US
To: BANGKOK
MANILA
SEOUL
TOKYO
TAIPEI INFO CINCPAC
Type: TE

Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 05 JUL 2006